Abstract-This paper analyzes the impacts of flexible demands on day-ahead market outcomes in a system with significant wind power production. We use a two-stage stochastic market-clearing model, where the first stage represents the day-ahead market and the second stage represents the real-time operation. On one hand, flexibility of demands is beneficial to the system as a whole since such flexibility reduces the operation cost, but on the other hand, shifts in demands from peak periods to off-peak periods may influence prices in such a way that demands may not be willing to provide flexibility. Specifically, we investigate the impacts of different degree of demand flexibility on day-ahead prices. A number of scenarios modeling the uncertainty associated with wind production at the operation stage, and nonconvexities due to start-up costs of generators and their minimum power outputs are taken into account.
Notation

Indices and Sets
Constants π ω
Probability of wind power production scenario ω. E j Minimum daily energy consumption by flexible demand j [MWh] . 
First-Stage Variables (Day-Ahead Market)
C S U it
Cost due to the start-up of unit i [$] in period t.
P it
Power scheduled for unit i in period t at the day-ahead market stage [MW] . D j t Load scheduled for flexible demand j in period t at the day-ahead market stage [MW] . θ nt Angle of node n in period t at the day-ahead market stage [rad] . 
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE sustained growth of renewable generation across the world has motivated the development of two-stage stochastic market-clearing models [1] , where the first stage represents the day-ahead market and the second stage describes the system operation [2] - [5] . Other modeling paradigm for incorporating stochastic renewable generation at the day-ahead market stage is adaptive robust optimization [8] . In robust optimization, the total cost is minimized for the worst-case realization of the uncertain parameters, and the recourse actions are taken once the uncertainties are realized in real-time operation [9] - [11] .
A common approach to cope with the uncertainty pertaining to renewable generations is to allocate a sufficient amount of generation capacity as reserve. However, with the recent increase in demand response [12] and [13] , flexible demands can contribute to integrate increasing amounts of renewable generation. In this context, demand flexibility stands out.
Flexibility is the operational ability of a unit or a demand to be scheduled by the system operator with some degree of freedom, i.e., irrespective of time-related constraints. Demand flexibility includes the ability to move consumption across periods, and to change the consumption level per period.
The contribution of demands in providing flexibility from the system operator point of view is discussed in [14] - [16] . However, a comprehensive analysis focusing on economic impacts of demand flexibility is missing in the references.
The work reported in this paper is motivated by practical case in mainland Spain (a system mostly based on gas and wind) where energy prices may swing between high prices driven by comparatively expensive gas units and low prices driven by comparatively cheap wind units. Such a price behavior has an impact on demand flexibility. Note that using either a stochastic or a deterministic market-clearing model does not affect this price behavior.
In the above context, the novel contribution of this paper is twofold:
1) analyzing the operational and economic impacts of demand flexibility, particularly on demand revenues; 2) providing a detailed two-stage stochastic market-clearing model incorporating and focused on demand flexibility. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the mathematical formulation of the stochastic two-stage clearing model including flexible demands. For the sake of clarity, an illustrative example is provided in Section III. Section IV reports and discusses results from a realistic case study. The conclusions and suggestion for future work are discussed in Section V.
II. MARKET MODEL
The stochastic market-clearing model below co-optimizes energy and reserve and incorporates stochastic generation and demand flexibility. For simplicity, the following assumptions are considered.
1) Uncertainty pertains solely to wind generation.
2) Production cost functions of generating units and utility functions of flexible demands are assumed to be linear.
3) The cost of deploying reserve is either the cost of energy production or the utility of a flexible demand, depending on the source deploying the reserve. 4) A dc representation of the transmission network is used. 5) No security criterion regarding equipment failure is considered. The MILP market-clearing model is:
subject to first-stage constraints:
second-stage constraints:
where The objective function (1) maximizes the expected social welfare. It includes the utilities of the flexible demands (i.e., demand bids), the start-up and energy (i.e., generation offers) of the conventional generating units, the production cost of the wind units, and the cost of involuntary load shedding, which is generally provided by the regulator and calculated using an appropriate methodology, e.g. [17] .
Note that demand utilities are equivalent to bid prices, bid by demand to the market, and thus, the model proposed incorporates demand bids. For simplicity we do not consider other sources of non-convexities, such as the shut-down costs of the generating units or their minimum up/down time constraints. Note, however, that these modeling improvements can be easily incorporated in the proposed model.
We do not consider reserve offer prices in this objective function, but allow units and flexible demands to specify the reserve levels (MW) that they are willing to provide, thus given them the opportunity of reserve deployment for a profit.
Constraint (2) represents the power balance at the market stage, where the unit and flexible demand schedules are determined. The start-up costs are modeled by (3) , which depend on the on/off status of each generating unit via binary variable u it in (4). The limits of generation, flexible demands, and wind production at the market stage are represented by (5)- (7), respectively. Constraint (8) enforces the ramping limits of generating units at the market stage. Similarly, constraint (9) enforces the pick-up/drop-down rate limits of flexible demands at the market stage. The pick-up/drop-down rates represent how a flexible load can increase or decrease its consumption. Constraints (10) establishes that node 1 is the reference node at the market stage.
Constraint (11) stands for power balance at the operation stages, where wind deviations are compensated by deploying reserves provided by conventional units and flexible demands, as well as (in rare cases) load shedding. The power output of unit i during period t and scenario ω is described by (12) , and the actual load for flexible demand j in period t and scenario ω by (13) . The reserve deployment provided by the conventional units shall respect the generation limits, and the reserve deployment provided by the flexible demands must be within the demand limits at actual operation. These limits are considered in (14) and (15), respectively. Constraint (16) represents the ramping limits of generating units, and constraint (17) represents the pick-up/drop-down rate limits of flexible demands at the operation stage. Constraint (18) enforces that the line flows stay within the transmission capacity limits at the operation stage. Note that enforcing this constraint is not generally required at the market stage. The market-stage schedules can violate these limits as long as actual power flows are still within the transmission limits in any realization of the wind scenario at the operation stage. A minimum daily energy consumption of flexible demand j is enforced by (19) . Constraints (20-23) stand for maximum up and down reserves provided by conventional units and flexible demands, respectively. The limits of load shedding and wind spillage are provided in (24) and (25), respectively. Constraint (26) establishes node 1 as the reference node at the operation stage. Non-negativity of scheduled productions and consumptions, start-up costs, wind productions, deployed reserves, wind spillage, and load shedding are enforced by (27) .
Note that in the case of inflexible demands, variables d The market-clearing model above implicitly accounts for price response on the demand side, as each demand may specify its flexibility range as a proxy of its price responsiveness. Depending on how advantageous forecast prices are for demands, their flexibility range can vary from zero to a fixed value. In other words, the bid utility price is also a price-responsive mechanism.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
For illustration purposes, we apply the proposed marketclearing model to the simple three-bus network shown in Fig. 1 . We consider a horizon of two periods for this analysis. All line reactances are equal to 0.13 p.u. and all line capacities are set to be high enough to avoid congestion. The system includes three conventional units, three demands and a wind power plant.
The data of the conventional units are provided in Table I . Hence, all units can be dispatched for both energy and reserve. Also, no limitations are assumed for the ramping rates of the conventional units.
We consider demand utilities to be zero. The prices are therefore driven solely by the production costs of the units. We also assume that demands do not provide reserve and that flexibility for demands is the ability of shifting load across time periods. We consider a minimum energy consumption E j of 180 MWh, 111 MWh, and 209 MWh for demands D 1 , D 2 , and D 3 , respectively. It should be noted that the purpose of this example is to illustrate how demands are allocated differently in a flexible demand case and in an inflexible demand case where the consumption pattern is assumed to be fixed, i.e., D j t = D j t . Furthermore, the example also illustrates how this different allocation affects productions, prices, and consequently, producer profits and consumer payments.
The wind power plant, at node 2, has an installed capacity of 300 MW. A small production cost of $0.3/MWh is assumed for this unit. Two equi-probable scenarios are used to model the wind power output uncertainty for each time period. They Below, we present and compare results, particularly dayahead schedules and day-ahead prices, for two cases, one with flexible demands and other with inflexible demands. We remark that in this example demand flexibility is the ability to move consumption across periods. Fig. 2 shows the day-ahead scheduled production (upper plots) and scheduled demands (bottom plots) for the cases described. In the case with inflexible demands, the consumption is assumed to be fixed to 283 MW in t 1 and to 217 MW in t 2 (total 500 MW). In this allocation, none of the conventional units is scheduled at t 1 (the load is covered solely by the wind unit), whereas all of them are scheduled at t 2 . On the other hand, in the case with flexibility, demand is moved from t 2 to t 1 so that a larger load share (378 MW from 500 MW) is allocated to t 1 and a smaller one (122 MW from 500 MW) to t 2 .
Table III provides the day-ahead prices λ t and the probabilityremoved balancing prices λ tω /π ω per scenario. Note that these prices are obtained as dual variables of the market-clearing model after setting the binary unit-commitment variables to their optimal values [18] . Since there is no congestion in any of the scenarios considered, electricity prices do not change across nodes. At t 1 , the price from the inelastic demand case is the lowest, whereas it is the highest at t 2 . This is due to the commitment decisions: since none of the conventional units is committed at t 1 and there are no ramping limits, the corresponding prices obtained are solely driven by the small cost of the wind unit. However, at t 2 all conventional units are online and the corresponding prices are related to the variable cost of unit U 3 . Under flexible demands, the shift of demands from t 2 to t 1 turns unit U 1 on at t 1 , which results in a higher price ($10.03/MWh) than that of the inflexible demand case ($0.3/MWh). In summary, demand flexibility results in higher prices in valley and slightly lower prices in peak.
Given these schedules and prices, the day-ahead profit, expected profit, day-ahead cost, expected cost, consumer payment, and uplift for the different cases are presented in IV. The inflexible demand case results in a higher expected cost and a lower day-ahead cost than those from the case with flexibility. The comparatively lower day-ahead cost of the inflexible demand case is due to a higher amount of wind power scheduled at the market stage.
Also, the inflexible demand case results in a smaller total dayahead profit and a larger total expected profit than those from the flexible demand case. The former is due to the off status of the conventional units at t 1 and the latter results from high prices obtained at t 2 . Note that under the day-ahead prices obtained, units U 1 and U 2 cannot recover their production costs in the flexible demand case, as well as U 2 and U 3 in the inflexible demand case. These losses disappear or decrease, if the respective units are deployed at the operation stage, such as unit U 1 in the flexible demand case and unit U 2 in the inflexible demand case. A common practice is that the day-ahead losses are calculated and paid to the respective units as a side-payment, also called uplift. Note that uplifts are only for the purpose of making these losses zero. In this example, uplifts are provided for both cases. The total producer profits as well as the costs paid by consumers are provided as well. The consumer payment is smaller under the inflexible demands than that under flexible demands. In other words, demand flexibility results in prices that increase the demand expenses. Therefore, although demand flexibility is beneficial to the system as a whole, it can result in prices not beneficial for the flexible demands.
IV. CASE STUDY: RTS SYSTEM
This section presents results from the proposed model using a 24-node system based on the single-area IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) [19] . Note that we have modified some of the characteristics of the RTS system in order to facilitate the analyses of the results.
The system considered has 34 lines, 8 conventional units, and 1 wind power unit. The data of conventional units are provided in Table V. Note that apart from hydro units U 50 , the rest of the units have relatively high production costs as compared to cheap wind generation. Such a generation mix is motivated by the case of mainland Spain, whose generation mix is dominated by gas and wind units. Considering this generation mix, we note that gas units (CCGTs) are generally not subject to minimum up/down time constraints. Therefore, these constraints will not affect our results. We assume that the limit of reserve capacity is equal to the capacity of each conventional unit.
Table VI provides demand data. Similar to the illustrative example and for simplicity, the utility of demands is considered to be zero.
The wind power unit, located at node 7, has an installed capacity of 1000 MW. Wind speed data are obtained from the System Advisor Model (SAM) [20] . We use wind speed data from Austin, Texas, and apply the power curve of a 2-MW wind turbine (Vestas V80/2000 with a hub height of 80 m) to generate the hourly wind-power productions for 24 time periods. The power curve of this turbine model can be found in [21] .
We consider 30 equi-probable scenarios for the wind power output at the operation stage.
Below, the results for two cases are presented: one without congestion and without ramping limits, and other with both congestion and ramping limits. Fig . 3 . Day-ahead production scheduled over 24 periods (RTS system).
A. Base Case: No Congestion
For this case study, we consider high enough transmission capacity for lines so that no congestion occurs. Therefore, prices are the same across nodes. Also, the ramping limits of units are assumed to be equal to their capacities.
For the case with inflexible demands, demands D j t are fixed to given load value D j t , i.e., D j t = D j t , with off-peak values during the early morning and the late evening, and peak values over day hours. Our purpose is to analyze how demand flexibility, in term of its ability to shift load across the periods, affects market outcomes.
For the simulations, we use CPLEX 12.5.0 under MATLAB on a computer with two Intel(R) Core(TM) processors clocking at 2.7 GHz and 8 GB of RAM. Table VII provides the dimension of the problem in terms of number of variables and constraints, and the required computation time. Fig. 3 shows the day-ahead energy production of all units scheduled over all periods. In the flexible demand case, the wind power output scheduled is almost twice than that in the inflexible demand case. Also, units U 90 and U 197 (the one located at node 22) stay offline in the flexible demand case, while all conventional units including expensive unit U 90 are scheduled in the inflexible demand case. The impact of unit U 90 on the day-ahead prices is analyzed below.
Figs. 4 and 5 show the total scheduled demand and the dayahead prices, respectively.
In the case with inflexible demands (blue and squares), during periods t 1 − t 4 demands are relatively small and can be supplied solely by wind generation. In the mid-day hours, demand grows while wind generation decreases. Therefore, to cover the demands, other units are required. Focusing on the outcome from flexible demands (red and circles), demands are shifted to t 1 − t 5 and t 20 − t 24 . Correspondingly, the day-ahead prices have a different behavior for these cases: in the case with inflexible demands, at t 1 − t 3 and t 22 − t 24 the day-ahead prices are derived from the small production cost of wind unit, and therefore, are very low. With the load increase starting at t 4 , the prices increase until t 20 , when the load decreases. In the flexible demand case, the day-ahead prices are relatively high for all periods, however still smaller than the peak price of the inflexible demand case. They are overall high since this allocation of demands is covered in all hours by the wind power output as well as the conventional units, with the exception of expensive unit U 90 . Mainly due to the off status of unit U 90 , the peak price of the case with flexible demands is smaller than that of the inflexible demand case.
Table VIII provides details regarding day-ahead profits, expected profits, day-ahead costs, expected costs, consumer payments, uplifts, and total day-ahead scheduled demand resulting from the two case: flexible and inflexible demands.
For the same amount of scheduled demand (i.e., 19,671 MWh), smaller day-ahead and expected costs are obtained from the flexible demand case than from the inflexible demand one.
Focusing on unit profits, only unit U 197 cannot recover the production cost for the case of flexible demands, while both units U 197 as well as unit U 90 incur losses under the inflexible demand case. Higher day-ahead and expected profits result from the flexible demand case than from the inflexible case. Finally, a smaller consumer payment is obtained from the case with inflexible demands. This observation shows an inherent conflict in incorporating demand flexibility into an energy market: on one hand the system benefits from the demand flexibility, but on the other hand the resulting prices increases the demand expenses. Thus, demands might be better off being inflexible.
B. Impact of Ramping Limits and Congestion
In this section, we consider that the ramping capability of each unit is half of its capacity. That is, reduced flexibility is provided by the conventional units to the system as compared to the base case. Also, in order to create congestion, we consider reduced transmission capacity for the lines connecting node 2 to 1, to 4, and to 6, node 4 to 9, node 5 to 10, and node 17 to 18, and to 22.
As an example of the day-ahead prices obtained, Fig. 7 shows the prices at node 5 over the 24-hour study horizon. Similarly to the trend observed in the case without congestion, the prices from the flexible demand case are higher over the off-peak periods and lower over the peak-periods with respect to the prices from the case with inflexible demands. The day-ahead prices (LMPs) are shown in Fig. 6 for period t 19 as an example of the nodal prices obtained. The LMPs from the inflexible case are higher than those from the flexible demand case in this period. This observation is also valid for the other peak periods, when price differentiation across nodes appears. Note that congestion does not occur over the off-peak periods. In other words, the case with inflexible demand results in higher prices over the peak periods, and congestion does not change this trend.
Similar to the base case, producer profits and operation costs, as well as consumer payments and uplifts are provided in Table IX for a total consumption of 19,671 MWh.
The case with inflexible demands result in a higher day-ahead cost, a higher expected cost, a lower day-head total producer profit, a lower expected total producer profit, and a smaller consumer payment as well as a higher uplift than those from the flexible demand case. Therefore, congestion and ramping limits of the conventional units do not change the conclusions from the previous case study, of which the most important one is that demands incur higher expenses under the flexible demand case.
We note that this paper uses the prevalent price scheme in industry [18] , which is different from pricing schemes based on cost-recovery conditions, e.g., [22] . We also note that if pricing schemes other than the one adopted [18] are used, e.g., a convexhull pricing [23] or those reported in [22] , [24] , and [25] , the conclusions derived in our study are likely to be remain valid provided that the final prices do not deviate significantly from marginal prices.
Also, we note that incorporating an ac network representation will not change the conclusions of the study, as active and reactive powers are fairly decoupled in transmission networks. However, a possible way to incorporate an ac network representation in our analysis is through convex relaxation techniques [26] . Nevertheless, the use of such techniques is outside the scope of this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the economic consequences resulting from the actions of flexible demands in a market with a significant amount of wind power production with very low marginal cost and gas units with comparatively high marginal cost. This analysis is motivated by the generation mix (gas and wind dominated) of the electric energy system of mainland Spain.
On one hand, demand flexibility (the ability of some demands to move load from peak periods to off-peak periods) is beneficial for the system as a whole since it decreases the expected operation cost, but on the other hand, demand flexibility can result in price increases that in turn increase demand expenses. Therefore, demands might be better off being inflexible in systems with a generation mix dominated by gas and wind units. This paper comprehensively analyzes this effect.
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